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Jesse M. Friedt
The securities laws have permitted hundreds of firms to exit the mandatory disclo-
sure system even though these firms' shares continue to be publicly traded and may be
held by thousands of investors. Such exiting firms are said to "go dark" because they
subsequently tend to provide little information to public investors. This Article describes
the going-dark phenomenon and considers its implications for the longstanding debate
over the desirability of mandatory disclosure. The Article also puts forward a new ap-
proach to regulating firms seeking to go dark: giving public shareholders a veto right
over exit from mandatory disclosure.
INTRODUCTION
Most publicly traded firms in the United States are considered
"reporting companies" subject to the mandatory periodic disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws.' Firms subject to these re-
quirements must periodically provide financial information to the
market, as well as make public information about insiders' self-dealing
transactions and compensation arrangements Such periodic disclo-
sures benefit investors by facilitating trading in the firm's shares and
by enabling investors to monitor insiders, thus reducing agency costs.
Although the mandatory disclosure system has been described as
a difficult-to-exit "lobster trap,"3 a reporting company is currently per-
mitted to terminate its disclosure obligations while remaining publicly
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1 These periodic disclosure requirements are found in § 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and various SEC regulations implementing this statute. See 15 USC § 78m; 17 CFR § 229.301.
2 A reporting firm must disclose in its annual report detailed information on the firm's
financial results, its assets and financial condition, legal proceedings against the firm, and infor-
mation on the firm's officers and directors. See, for example, 15 USC § 78m; 17 CFR § 229.301
(listing types of financial data to be disclosed); 17 CFR § 229.303a (describing requirements for
"[mlanagement's discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations" in the
annual report).
3 See generally Edward Rock, Securities Regulation As Lobster Trap: A Credible Com-
mitment Theory of Mandatory Disclosure, 23 Cardozo L Rev 675 (2002).
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traded if two conditions are satisfied: (1) trading in the firm's securities
is moved exclusively to the "Pink Sheets" over-the-counter (OTC) mar-
ket; and (2) the firm does not have any class of securities outstanding
with three hundred or more "holders of record."
This "recordholder" test would appear to prevent any firm with
three hundred or more shareholders from exiting mandatory disclo-
sure. However, the test currently does not define a "holder of record"
as the real (or "beneficial") owner of the firm's stock, but rather as the
party "identified as the owner" of the security on the firm's records.5
Most shares in publicly traded firms are held by nominees, such as
banks and brokerage houses, not by the beneficial owners themselves.
Each nominee, in turn, holds its shares on behalf of dozens, hundreds,
or even thousands of institutional and individual investors.! Thus, a
reporting company with thousands of beneficial shareholders can easi-
ly have fewer than three hundred "holders of record" and be eligible
to exit mandatory disclosure.
Over the last several years, insiders of hundreds of US compa-
nies-some with thousands of public shareholders-have taken advan-
tage of the current recordholder test to exit the mandatory disclosure
system while their shares continue to be publicly traded. Some firms
had more than three hundred recordholders shortly before exiting but
used a reverse stock split or repurchase tender offer to get below the
three hundred recordholder threshold. Firms exiting mandatory dis-
closure are said to "go dark" because, after exit, insiders generally
refuse to provide any information to public investors. Not surprisingly,
an announcement that a firm will exit mandatory disclosure typically
causes a sharp drop in its stock price.
In 2003, a number of institutional investors petitioned the SEC to
change the definition of "holder of record" under the recordholder test
to "beneficial owner."' Such a change would prevent firms with three
hundred or more beneficial owners from exiting mandatory disclosure.
Revising the shareholder threshold in this manner would make it more
difficult for publicly traded firms to exit mandatory disclosure without
first undertaking a reverse stock split or repurchase tender offer.
4 See 15 USC § 781.
5 See 17 CFR § 240.12g5-1(a).
6 See Michael K. Molitor, Will More Sunlight Fade the Pink Sheets? Increasing Public
Information about Non-reporting Issuers with Quoted Securities, 39 Ind L Rev 309,315-16 (2006).
7 See SEC, Petition for Commission Action to Require Exchange Act Registration of Over-
the-counter Equity Securities (July 3,2003), online at httpJ/www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/petn4483.htm
(visited Jan 11, 2009).
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In 2006, the SEC's Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Com-
panies addressed the issue of firms going dark.' Echoing the institu-
tional investors' petition, the Committee recommended that the SEC
change the definition of "holder of record" to "beneficial owner."9
More generally, it urged the SEC to reconsider its approach to regu-
lating exits from the mandatory disclosure system.'° However, the SEC
has yet to act on these recommendations. Thus, insiders of publicly
traded firms are still able to exit mandatory disclosure even when
their firms have thousands of public shareholders after exit.
The purpose of this Article is threefold: (1) to explain how a firm can
go dark over the objection of its public investors; (2) to show that insid-
ers' post-exit disclosure practices cast further doubt on the claim, ad-
vanced by critics of mandatory disclosure, that insiders can be counted
on to voluntarily provide adequate information to public investors; and
(3) to put forward a new approach to regulating exits from mandatory
disclosure: giving public shareholders the right to veto such exits.
Part I of this Article describes the going-dark phenomenon. It ex-
plains how a firm's insiders can exit mandatory disclosure even though
the firm's shares continue to be publicly traded and may be held by thou-
sands of investors who prefer that the firm remain a reporting company.
It then describes the characteristics of firms that go dark and the stock
market's sharply negative reaction to going-dark announcements.
Part II examines the disclosure practices of firms that have gone
dark and explores their implications for the longstanding debate in
securities regulation over whether mandatory disclosure is needed. It
begins by describing this debate. Critics of mandatory disclosure argue
that insiders can be counted on voluntarily to provide the "firm-
optimal" level of disclosure-that which maximizes the joint wealth of
insiders and public investors. Defenders of mandatory disclosure dis-
agree, arguing that insiders often have an incentive to provide less
than the firm-optimal level of disclosure. Part II then briefly describes
recent studies examining the effect of imposing mandatory disclosure
on certain OTC firms in 1965 that previously had not been subject to
these disclosure requirements. These studies' findings raise questions
about critics' claim that insiders voluntarily provide sufficient infor-
mation to investors. The disclosure practices of gone-dark firms, Part
II shows, cast further doubt on this claim. Only a small fraction of
firms that go dark provide any financial information publicly to their
8 See SEC, Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies 85 (Apr
23, 2006), online at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf (visited Jan 11,
2009).
9 See id at 83.
10 See id at 91-92.
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hundreds or thousands of public investors. Part II explains why it is
highly unlikely that, for the vast majority of these gone-dark firms, the
firm-optimal level of disclosure is zero. The fact that stock prices drop
substantially when firms announce they will exit mandatory disclosure
provides further reason to be skeptical that post-exit disclosure levels
are generally firm-optimal.
Part III addresses the question of how exits from mandatory dis-
closure should be regulated. It begins by explaining that when insiders
can unilaterally decide to exit mandatory disclosure, they may have an
incentive to exit even when such exit reduces firm value. The institu-
tional investors' proposal to prohibit firms with three hundred or more
beneficial shareholders from exiting mandatory disclosure, it shows,
would decrease value-reducing exits but not eliminate them. Part III
then puts forward a new approach to regulating exits from mandatory
disclosure: requiring public investor approval before insiders can turn
off the lights. Such an approach, it demonstrates, would prevent a firm
from exiting mandatory disclosure as a publicly traded company un-
less such exit increases firm value.
I. FIRMS GOING DARK
This Part examines the phenomenon of firms "going dark"-exiting
the mandatory disclosure system even though their shares remain public-
ly traded and may be held by thousands of investors. Part L.A explains
how insiders can cause their firms to go dark over the objection of public
investors. Part I.B briefly explores the characteristics of going-dark firms
and describes the stock market's reaction to going-dark announcements.
A. How Firms Go Dark
I begin by describing the current reach of the mandatory disclo-
sure regime and then explain how insiders are able to exit the manda-
tory disclosure system without the consent of public investors.
1. The current reach of mandatory disclosure.
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 193411 ("Exchange Act"),
most firms selling shares to public investors in the United States are
required to become "reporting companies": they must file a registra-
tion statement with the SEC and enter the mandatory periodic disclo-
11 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-291,48 Stat 74, codified as amended at 15
USC § 78a et seq.
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sure system." This requirement is triggered, for example, when a firm
registers a class of securities on a national securities exchange,13 or
when the firm has more than $10 million in assets and a class of secur-
ities with at least five hundred holders of record."
A reporting company's disclosure obligations are extensive. The
firm must periodically provide the market with information about its
financial condition, such as a balance sheet and income statement, as
well as publicly disclose information about insiders' self-dealing trans-
actions, stock purchases and sales, and compensation arrangements.'5
The firm must also notify the market whenever there has been a ma-
terial change in its financial condition or operations."
A firm that wishes to remain publicly traded generally cannot ex-
it the mandatory disclosure system For example, a reporting company
cannot exit mandatory disclosure and remain eligible to trade on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Nasdaq Stock Market."
This restriction against exit, however, does not apply if trading in a
firm's shares is moved exclusively to the Pink Sheets OTC market: an
electronic quotation service that provides a trading platform for thou-
sands of companies. A firm that is willing to be traded only on the
Pink Sheets may generally exit mandatory disclosure as long as the
firm does not have outstanding any class of securities with at least
three hundred "holders of record."' 9
This recordholder test would appear to prevent firms with three
hundred or more shareholders from exiting the mandatory disclosure
system. However, for purposes of applying the recordholder test, the
securities laws do not define a "holder of record" as the ultimate
beneficial owner of the stock. Rather, a group of beneficial owners is
counted as a single "holder of record" if the group's shares are held in
12 The periodic disclosure requirements are found in § 13 the Exchange Act, as amended,
and the SEC's regulations implementing the Exchange Act. See 15 USC §§ 781, 78m.
13 See 15 USC § 781(b). Firms whose securities trade on Nasdaq or the OTC Bulletin
Board (OTCBB) markets must also be reporting companies. See Molitor, 39 Ind L Rev at 332-34
(cited in note 6).
14 See 15 USC § 781(g); 17 CFR § 240.12g-1. A firm must also register with the SEC and
enter the mandatory disclosure system if it files a registration statement to sell shares to the public
under § 15(d). See 15 USC § 78o(d). See also Molitor, 39 Ind L Rev at 313-14 (cited in note 6).
15 See note 2.
16 See 17 CER § 249.308.
17 See Molitor, 39 Ind L Rev at 332-34 (cited in note 6).
18 Id at 329-32 (cited in note 6).
19 Under the recordholder test, a firm with assets of $10 million or less is not subject to
continuing mandatory disclosure requirements unless it has a class of securities with at least five
hundred holders of record. See 17 CFR § 240.12g-4(a)(1)(ii). However, firms going dark often
have assets exceeding $10 million. See Part I.B. Thus, for convenience, I assume throughout this
Article that the applicable threshold for continuing mandatory disclosure requirements under
the recordholder test is three hundred holders of record.
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street name by a single financial institution.o As a result, a firm with
thousands of beneficial shareholders may have fewer than three hun-
dred recordholders and be able to satisfy the recordholder test for
exiting mandatory disclosure.21
To be sure, a firm exiting the federal mandatory disclosure system
is still subject to any information disclosure requirements imposed by
the corporate law of the state in which it is domiciled. However, these
requirements, if any, tend to be minimal." Strikingly, the state that has
attracted the most incorporations of public companies-Delaware-
has no periodic disclosure requirements. Thus, a Delaware-domiciled
firm that exits mandatory disclosure is not required to disclose any
information to public investors.3
2. Exiting the mandatory disclosure system.
I now describe the process by which a reporting company can exit
mandatory disclosure without public investors' consent and remain
publicly traded. I first consider a firm that currently has fewer than
three hundred recordholders, and then a firm that currently has at
least three hundred recordholders.
a) Firms with fewer than three hundred recordholders. Consider a
reporting company that currently has fewer than three hundred re-
cordholders. Such a firm already satisfies the recordholder test. If the
firm's stock is currently traded exclusively on the Pink Sheets, the firm
can exit mandatory disclosure immediately and continue to be publicly
20 See 17 CFR § 240.12g5-1; Molitor, 39 Ind L Rev at 315-16 (cited in note 6) (explaining that
securities are typically held of record by banks and broker dealers, not the beneficial owner).
21 Once a Pink Sheets-traded reporting company has fewer than three hundred recordhold-
ers, it need only take one simple step to exit the mandatory disclosure system: filing a one-page
Form 15 with the SEC indicating the provision under which the firm is exempt from these disclo-
sure requirements. See 17 CFR § 249.323; Molitor, 39 Ind L Rev at 347 (cited in note 6).
22 See Robert B. Thompson and Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud As Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 Vand L Rev 859,867 (2003).
23 All states, including Delaware, have shareholder inspection statutes that permit individ-
ual shareholders to seek to examine the books and records of a firm. See, for example, 8 Del C
§ 220(b) (Michie). If access to such information were costless, and the information were com-
plete, these inspection statutes would effectively provide periodic disclosure. However, accessing
corporate information through shareholder inspection statutes is quite difficult in practice. Ex-
aminations are usually resisted by managers, requiring individual shareholders to incur expenses
litigating for access to the information. See Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitor-
ing and Corporate Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 Ariz L Rev
331,356-57 (1996) (noting that shareholders hoping to get access to books and records may need
to spend $20,000 to $50,000 in litigation fees). Moreover, the information obtainable through
shareholder inspection is limited. The Delaware statute does not even provide what information
corporations should preserve for inspection. A shareholder who litigates for access to the records
may thus find precious little there. As a result, state corporate law inspection rights are in no way
a substitute for the periodic disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws.
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traded. If the firm's stock is traded on another market, the stock must
be "delisted" and trading moved exclusively to the Pink Sheets.U Delist-
ing generally does not require shareholder approval (let alone the con-
sent of public investors)."' Thus, insiders of firms that have fewer than
three hundred recordholders can cause these firms to exit the mandatory
disclosure system over the objection of public investors, regardless of
where these firms' shares are currently traded.
b) Firms with at least three hundred recordholders. Now consider
a reporting firm that has at least three hundred recordholders. Like a
firm with fewer than three hundred recordholders, it cannot exit man-
datory disclosure as a publicly traded firm unless its shares are (or will
be) traded exclusively on the Pink Sheets. Thus, insiders may need to
delist the firm's shares from another market which, again, can be done
without public shareholder approval.
In addition, the firm must eliminate enough recordholders to get
below the three hundred recordholder threshold. As I explain in more
detail below, there are two possible techniques for reducing the num-
ber of recordholders, both of which involve repurchasing some of the
firm's stock: (1) a reverse stock split, and (2) a repurchase tender offer.
The reverse stock split sometimes does not require public shareholder
approval; the repurchase tender offer never requires public sharehold-
er approval. Thus, insiders can often find a way to satisfy the record-
holder test without public shareholder approval.
Of course, to eliminate the required number of recordholders, the
firm must have on hand (or borrow, perhaps from insiders) adequate
cash. The more shareholders that must be eliminated to satisfy the
recordholder test, the more cash will be needed. In certain cases, the
cash requirement may be substantial enough to discourage insiders from
exiting. The important point here, however, is that insiders can some-
times unilaterally exit mandatory disclosure even if the firm has three
hundred or more recordholders shortly before exit.
i) Reverse stock split. The first approach to reducing the
number of recordholders is to undertake a reverse stock split (for ex-
24 Because the Pink Sheets market has no listing requirements, any firm that delists itself
from a stock exchange can be traded on the Pink Sheets. See Molitor, 39 Ind L Rev at 311 (cited
in note 6).
25 See, for example, NYSE, Listed Company Manual § 806.02, online at http://www.nyse.
com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http://www.nyse.com/regulationltisted/1182508124422.html&displayPa
ge=/lcm/lcmsection.html (visited Jan 11, 2009) (indicating that board approval is sufficient for
firms to delist from the NYSE); Molitor, 39 Ind L Rev at 344 n 206 (cited in note 6). Shareholder
approval could be required by the firm's corporate charter, but I have not been able to find any
evidence of the use of such provisions.
26 See Molitor, 39 Ind L Rev at 344-47 (cited in note 6) (explaining that delisting from any
trading market generally requires only board approval).
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ample, giving each shareholder one new share for every thousand old
shares). Under corporate law, those who would receive only a fraction
of a new share in a reverse stock split (in this example, those with few-
er than one thousand old shares) can be forced to accept cash in lieu
of that fractional share. Thus, a reverse stock split can be used to in-
voluntarily cash out many shareholders. The price for cashed-out frac-
tional shares, which is set by the firm, may be lower than the share's
actual value. '
Public investors' consent is not always required for a reverse
stock split. Some state corporate laws may permit a reverse stock split
without shareholder approval in certain circumstances." And in those
states requiring shareholder approval, such approval can easily be ob-
tained without public shareholder approval when insiders own a major-
ity of the firm's shares. Public investors will thus be unable to block a
reverse stock split unless: (1) the state in which the firm is incorporated
requires a shareholder vote, and (2) public investors own a majority of
the firm's shares.
ii) Repurchase tender offer. The second approach to reducing
the number of record shareholders is to conduct a repurchase tender
offer: the firm offers to buy back a certain number of shares (usually for
a fixed price) from shareholders.30 Individual shareholders decide
whether or not to sell their shares back to the company. If enough pub-
lic shareholders tender their shares, a firm that currently has three
hundred or more recordholders can get below the three hundred re-
cordholder threshold. Unlike a reverse stock split, a repurchase tender
offer never requires shareholder approval.
Public shareholder participation in the repurchase tender offer is
voluntary. Thus, public investors who prefer that the firm remain a
reporting company might consider refusing to tender their shares. If
enough public investors "boycott" the repurchase tender offer, the
firm will not be able to reduce the number of recordholders below
three hundred and exit mandatory disclosure.
27 See id at 343 n 203.
28 If the board uses an egregiously low cash-out price, shareholders may be able to success-
fully sue directors for breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty. But directors are unlikely to be
found liable if they set the cash-out price to the shares' pre-split trading price. And the board can
depress the pre-split trading price by announcing that the firm will go dark. Thus, insiders may
well be able to use the reverse stock split to buy back shares at a bargain price.
29 See, for example, Minn Stat Ann § 302A.137(a) (West) (requiring shareholder vote for a
combination of outstanding shares of a class or series into a lesser number of shares of the class
or series only where each other class or series of shares is not subject to a similar combination).
30 For a discussion of the mechanics and regulation of repurchase tender offers, see Jesse M.
Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U Chi L Rev 421,
424-32 (2000).
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However, it will be risky for public shareholders to boycott the
repurchase tender offer in the hope that the offer will fail. If enough
other public shareholders tender their shares, the firm will be able to
exit mandatory disclosure, leaving the boycotting shareholders with
stock in a dark firm. Thus, individual public shareholders may feel
pressure to tender even if they would prefer the firm to remain a re-
porting company. That is, they may feel coerced to tender their shares
even if the offer price is less than the value of the stock were the firm
to remain a reporting company.' The result is a suboptimal outcome
for public shareholders as a group: enough coerced shareholders ten-
der that the firm can go dark."
B. Characteristics of firms going dark
The Pink Sheets is currently home to approximately 3,700 firms
trading outside of the mandatory disclosure system. Many of these
3,700 companies had previously traded as dark firms on another OTC
market-the OTCBB market-but fled to the Pink Sheets around
31 Consider Lucian A. Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Cor-
porate Takeovers, 98 Harv L Rev 1695, 1708-32 (1985) (exploring the pressure-to-tender prob-
lem in the context of hostile takeover bids).
32 For example, suppose ABC's shares are worth $12 each if ABC remains a reporting
company, but only $8 if ABC goes dark. And suppose ABC offers $10 per share in a repurchase
tender offer. The offer is conditional on enough holders tendering their shares that the firm can
satisfy the recordholder test and go dark. If too few shares are tendered, the tendered shares are
returned to the public investors and the firm remains a reporting company.
Collectively, the public shareholders prefer that ABC remains a reporting company; their
stock will be worth $12 per share. But each public shareholder individually has an incentive to
tender into the $10 offer. Tendering a share yields either $12 (if the offer fails, and the share is
returned to the tendering stockholder) or $10 (if the offer succeeds). Failing to tender yields
either $12 (if the offer fails) or $8 (if the offer succeeds and the firm goes dark). The public
shareholder is thus better off tendering in the event the offer succeeds, and not worse off if the
offer fails. A rational shareholder will thus choose to tender (and hope that the offer fails). But if
enough shareholders tender, the offer will succeed, and public investors will get $10 per share for
stock that would be worth $12 per share if the firm were to remain a reporting company.
33 Over 4,300 domestically incorporated firms trade exclusively on the Pink Sheets. See
Pink Sheets, About Pink OTC Markets, online at http://www.pinksheets.com/pink/about/index.jsp
(visited Jan 11, 2009). All domestically incorporated, reporting firms trading on the Pink Sheets
are categorized as "Current Information" domestic firms, of which there are about six hundred.
Id (generating 604 matches when using the search function at http'//www.pinksheetscom/pink/
companysearch/index.jsp (visited Jan 11, 2009), and checking only the box labeled "Pink Sheets
Current" and selecting "Domestic" from the pull-down menu labeled "Security Locale"). All but
a handful of the "Current Information" firms appear to be reporting companies. Thus, there are
approximately 3,700 domestic firms traded exclusively on the Pink Sheets that are outside of the
mandatory disclosure system.
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1999 when the SEC imposed mandatory disclosure requirements on
all OTCBB firms, regardless of the number of recordholders.34
Hundreds of these nonreporting Pink Sheet firms were previous-
ly reporting companies under the securities laws before going dark. A
study by Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis, and Tracy Wang ("Leuz
study") provides data on firms that went dark between 1998 and
2004. The Leuz study found that during this period almost five hun-
dred reporting companies went dark." These firms tended to be small:
the average book value of the firms' assets was about $16 million
when they exited the mandatory disclosure system."
In explaining their decisions to go dark, insiders often cite the high
costs of being a reporting company.3 The desire to avoid such costs is a
plausible reason for exiting mandatory disclosure. Firms going dark tend
to be relatively small; the expense of complying with mandatory disclo-
sure would be disproportionately burdensome for such firms. Moreover,
the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,39 which has raised reporting
costs, appears to have increased the tendency of firms to go dark. 4
Despite these potential compliance cost savings, the market reacts
extremely negatively to announcements that firms are exiting mandato-
ry disclosure. In a ten-day window around the time firms announce
their intention to go dark, abnormal (market-adjusted) cumulative re-
41turns are negative 10 percent. In contrast, firms announcing going-
private transactions (transacttions in which all public shareholders are
cashed out) experience positive market-adjusted returns in a compa-
41rable window. Over a twelve-month period beginning with the an-
nouncement, firms going dark experience abnormal negative returns of
34 See Molitor, 39 Ind L Rev at 334 n 147 (cited in note 8); Paul Rose, Balancing Public
Market Benefits and Burdens for Smaller Companies Post Sarbanes-Oxley, 41 Willamette L Rev
707,717-18 (2006).
35 See generally Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis, and Tracy Wang, Why Do Firms Go
Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations (ECGI Working
Paper No 155/2007, Mar 2008), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract=592421 (visited Jan 11, 2009).
See also Andras Marosi and Nadia Massoud, Why Do Firms Go Dark? *27 (University of Alberta
Working Paper, Nov 2005), online at www.business.ualberta.ca/nmassoud/pdf%20docments/
Dark-massoudNov2005.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009) (examining firms that went dark between
January 1996 and May 2004).
36 See Leuz, Triantis, and Wang, Why Do Firms Go Dark? at *2 (cited in note 35) (report-
ing that 484 firms went dark between 1998 and 2004).
37 Id at *52.
38 Id at *2.
39 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745, codified in relevant
part at 15 USC § 7201 et seq.
40 Leuz,Triantis, and Wang, Why Do Firms Go Dark? at *24-26 (cited in note 35).
41 Id at *28.
42 Id at *27-28.
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16 percent, with these returns becoming more negative as the period
lengthens.3
The Leuz study reported that, after going dark, firms typically
continued trading on the Pink Sheets for several years. By June 2005,
only about 14 percent of the firms that had exited mandatory disclo-
sure during the period 1998-2004 had ceased trading." Firms typically
ceased trading because they were acquired, went private, were liqui-
dated, or filed for bankruptcy.
Although firms going dark are often small, many have significant
assets and more than three hundred beneficial owners when they exit
mandatory disclosure. For example, United Road Services, a provider
of towing and transportation services, had assets of almost $100 mil-
lion and an estimated six thousand beneficial shareholders when it
went dark in 2003 with 294 holders of record.4 ' American Physicians
Capital, Inc (ACAP), a life insurance holding company, was believed to
have had over five hundred beneficial owners and almost $150 million
in total assets after it used a reverse stock split to reduce the number of
its holders of record below three hundred and then go dark." Thus, the
going-dark phenomenon is not limited to the smallest companies, nor to
firms with only a handful of shareholders.
II. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MANDATORY DISCLOSURE DEBATE
As Part I explained, hundreds of reporting firms have exited man-
datory disclosure in recent years even though their shares continued
to be publicly traded on the Pink Sheets market and may have been
held by thousands of investors. They joined several thousand other
dark firms trading on that market.
This Part examines the disclosure practices of companies that have
exited mandatory disclosure as publicly traded firms and considers the
implications of these practices for the longstanding debate in securities
regulation over whether mandatory disclosure is necessary. Part II.A
briefly describes the mandatory disclosure debate, which turns largely
on the following question: will insiders of public firms, in the absence
of mandatory disclosure, offer the firm-optimal level of disclosure (that
which maximizes firm value)? Critics of mandatory disclosure maintain
that insiders will voluntarily provide such disclosure; their opponents
disagree. Part II.A then surveys recent studies that seek to address
43 Id at *35.
44 See Leuz,Triantis, and Wang, Why Do Firms Go Dark? at *17 (cited in note 35).
45 See SEC, Petition for Commission Action (cited in note 7) (describing specific finms that
went dark).
46 See id.
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this question statistically by examining how the extension of mandato-
ry disclosure to certain OTC firms in 1965 affected these firms' stock
prices. These studies, it shows, cast some doubt on the critics' claim
that insiders will voluntarily provide firm-optimal disclosure.
Part II.B describes the disclosure choices of gone-dark firms: the
overwhelming majority of these firms provide no information to pub-
lic investors. It argues that this level of disclosure- zero -is unlikely
to maximize firm value, given the large potential benefits and relative-
ly low costs of disclosure. The fact that the market responds very nega-
tively to going-dark announcements provides additional evidence that
post-exit disclosure levels are not firm-optimal. All in all, the expe-
rience of gone-dark firms provides further reason to be skeptical of
claims that insiders will voluntarily offer the firm-optimal level of dis-
closure to public investors.
A. The Debate over Mandatory Disclosure
The mandatory disclosure system was created in the 1930s."7 All
firms trading on national exchanges were required to register with the
SEC and become reporting companies. In 1964, Congress amended the
securities laws to require all firms (including those traded on OTC mar-
kets) with a minimum number of recordholders and meeting certain as-
set requirements to enter the mandatory disclosure system by 1965.'
1. The debate.
There appears to be little debate over whether the periodic dis-
closure by publicly traded firms of at least some information can in-
crease firm value. Two important benefits of periodic disclosure are
worth highlighting. First, the publication of financial information re-
duces public investors' trading costs. Existing shareholders consider-
ing whether to sell their shares and potential shareholders considering
whether to buy shares must determine whether the stock is worth sell-
ing or buying at the current trading price. Such a determination will
require each investor to obtain a considerable amount of financial
information. The cost of such information acquisition aggregated across
all the investors buying and selling stock is much higher than the cost
47 See generally Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System, 9 J Corp L 1,1-9 (1983) (offering a brief history of the origins of the federal securities laws).
48 See Allen Ferrell, Mandatory Disclosure and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Over-the-
counter Market, 36 J Legal Stud 213, 214 (2007). See also Securities Act Amendments of 1964,
Pub L No 88-467,78 Stat 565, codified at 15 USC §§ 77-78.
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the firm would incur making that same information (which it has on
hand) publicly available. 9
Second, the provision of information to public investors is critical
for reducing insider agency costs. Corporate law imposes fiduciary
duties that constrain insiders' ability to engage in inefficient self-
dealing transactions. But the threat of fiduciary duty litigation is un-
likely to deter insiders from self-dealing unless shareholders have
"conflict information" 
-information about insiders' transactions with
the firm, compensation arrangements, and stock purchases and sales-
that enables them to detect such self-dealing." In addition, in those
firms where insiders do not own a controlling block of shares, the dis-
closure of financial information is critical for monitoring (and perhaps
replacing) management teams that may self-interestedly or incompe-
tently fail to make shareholder-serving business decisions.'2 Hostile
bidders or proxy challengers will not be able to identify and oust a
poorly performing team if they lack an accurate and up-to-date pic-
ture of the firm's financial and operating conditions.53
There is, however, considerable disagreement over whether the
government should make periodic corporate disclosure mandatory.
Since the 1960s, mandatory disclosure has come under attack from a
number of economists and law professors." These commentators, in-
cluding Professor Roberta Romano, argue that insiders can be counted
49 See John C. Coffee, Jr, Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclo-
sure System, 70 Va L Rev 717, 733-34 (1984) (arguing that mandatory disclosure "reduces waste-
ful duplication by establishing a central information repository"); Zohar Goshen and Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 Duke L J 711,738-40 (2006).
50 See, for example, Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 Va L Rev 1335, 1356-68 (1999) (describing benefits of
periodic disclosure, such as greater managerial adherence to shareholder interests); Paul G.
Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure As a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U Chi L Rev 1047, 1048
(1995) (arguing that periodic disclosure reduces the cost of monitoring managers' use of corpo-
rate assets for self-interested purposes).
51 See Goshen and Parchomovsky, 55 Duke LJ at 716-17 (cited in note 49).
52 See Merritt B. Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, 62 Law & Contemp
Probs 112,120 (1999).
53 See Goshen and Parchomovsky, 55 Duke L J at 748-49 (cited in note 49) (noting that
full disclosure puts poorly performing management teams at greater risk of replacement).
54 For economically oriented legal scholarship critical or skeptical of mandatory disclosure,
see, for example, Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regula-
tion, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L 387,389 (2001); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:A Mar-
ket Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 Yale L J 2359,2361 (1998); Stephen J. Choi and And-
rew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation,
71 S Cal L Rev 903,916 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclo-
sure and the Protection of Investors, 70 Va L Rev 669,687 (1984); Henry Manne, Insider Trading
and the Stock Market (Free Press 1966). For economists critical of mandatory disclosure, see
George Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 Am Econ Rev 132 (1973); George Stigler, Public Regulation of the
Securities Markets, 37 J Bus 117,133 (1964).
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on to adopt what might be a called a "firm-optimal" level of disclo-
sure-that which maximizes firm value (the joint wealth of insiders
and public investors).5 Absent such disclosure, they contend, the stock
price will drop because of a "lemons" problem: buyers will fear that no
news is bad news' Thus, it is argued, insiders of public firms will have
no choice but to offer a desirable level of disclosure. On this view,
mandatory disclosure is unnecessary and could actually reduce firm
value by requiring the firm to make disclosures whose costs exceed
their benefits.
Supporters of mandatory disclosure generally reject this view.
They suggest several reasons why insiders may sometimes offer less
than the firm-optimal amount of disclosure, even if such suboptimal
disclosure depresses the stock price.5 First, while insiders are generally
net sellers of stock and thus tend to prefer a higher price, insiders
wishing to buy large amounts of stock (directly, or indirectly through a
cash-out merger) may have an incentive to reduce disclosure to ac-
quire the stock more cheaply.8 Second, even when insiders would oth-
erwise prefer a higher stock price, they may be willing to put up with a
lower stock price if reducing disclosure enables them to extract more
private benefits. For example, the failure to disclose compensation
arrangements, stock transactions, and the like may make it easier for
insiders to transfer value from public investors through various forms
of self-dealing. In short, supporters of mandatory disclosure argue, the
"insider-optimal" level of disclosure may often be less than the "firm-
optimal" level of disclosure.
55 See Romano, 107 Yale L J at 2367 (cited in note 54) (arguing that promoters taking firms
public will "select the regime that maximizes the joint welfare of promoters and investors").
56 See Romano, 2 Theoretical Inq L at 418 (cited in note 54); Easterbrook and Fischel, 70
Va L Rev at 683 (cited in note 54).
57 See, for example, Coffee, 70 Va L Rev at 722 (cited in note 49); Goshen and Parcho-
movsky, 55 Duke L J at 760-61 (cited in note 49).
Some defenders of mandatory disclosure, such as Professor Merritt Fox, appear to agree
with Professor Romano that, absent mandatory disclosure, firms will offer the firm-optimal level
of disclosure. See Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 Theoretical Inquiries L 563, 566
(2001) (writing that, for purposes of his debate with Professor Romano over whether firms will
voluntarily choose the socially optimal level of disclosure, he is willing to assume that firms going
public would voluntarily adopt disclosure arrangements that maximize their share price). How-
ever, he argues that mandatory disclosure is justified because disclosure is likely to confer posi-
tive externalities on other firms. Thus, while firms have an incentive to offer the firm-optimal
level of disclosure, they do not have an incentive to offer the socially optimal level of disclosure,
which will tend to be higher. See id at 568-69.
58 See Coffee, 70 Va L Rev at 722 (cited in note 49).
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2. Recent empirical studies.
The desirability of mandatory disclosure thus largely turns on an
empirical question: do insiders not subject to mandatory disclosure
generally provide the firm-optimal amount of disclosure? Researchers
initially sought to answer this question by examining the disclosure
practices of OTC firms that were exempt from mandatory disclosure
until 1965, when mandatory disclosure was extended to all firms meet-
ing certain asset requirements and having more than a minimum
number of recordholders 9
Studies of OTC firms' pre-1965 disclosure practices suggest that
disclosure was not always firm-optimal. According to a 1957 SEC study
of 125 publicly traded insurance companies not subject to mandatory
disclosure, some with as much as $3 billion in assets, almost 50 percent
did not provide an income statement to shareholders.- Moreover, size
did not appear to correlate with the quality of financial reporting. In
1963, the SEC randomly sampled 20 percent of the OTC firms in
which trades had been made during the last quarter of 1961. More
than 25 percent of firms did not provide any information on the firm's
financial position or results. 6' Defenders of mandatory disclosure have
pointed to these studies as demonstrating that insiders will not always
provide adequate information to investors.6
At least one critic of mandatory disclosure was not persuaded by
the SEC's studies. Writing in 1998, Professor Romano argued that these
studies demonstrated merely that insiders voluntarily choose to dis-
close less than what the SEC deems adequate, not that insiders provide
too little information to shareholders. According to Romano, "There is
little tangible proof of the claim that corporate information is 'under-
produced' in the absence of mandatory disclosure."6' However, she
acknowledged that if the imposition of mandatory disclosure re-
quirements on these firms in 1965 was found to have a significantly
positive effect on stock prices, such a finding would be "probative"
that prior disclosure had been inadequate."'
59 See Ferrell, 36 J Legal Stud at 214 (cited in note 48) (describing the 1964 legislation).
60 See Seligman, 9 J Corp L at 39 (cited in note 47) (discussing a 1957 SEC study that
found that many insurance companies did not disclose income statements to shareholders).
61 See id at 39-40 (reporting that the 1957 SEC study found that "more than 25 percent of
the issuers responding did not disseminate any financial information to shareholders at all.").
62 See, for example, id at 39-42.
63 See Romano, 107 Yale L J at 2373 (cited in note 54).
64 See id at 2376-77.
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Two recent studies examining the effect of the imposition of man-
datory disclosure on OTC firms in 1965 find such a stock price effect.0
One study estimated that affected OTC firms experienced statistically
significant, positive abnormal returns ranging between 11 percent and
22 percent during the period from January 1, 1963 (around the time
regulatory change began to appear likely) through November 15, 1965.6
The second study reported a 6 percent abnormal return for 1963.67
These studies thus suggest that, contrary to the claims of mandatory
disclosure's critics, insiders of nonreporting firms before 1965 had failed
to voluntarily offer firm-optimal disclosure to investors.
To be sure, the fact that public investors' wealth increased sub-
stantially when these firms were forced to enter the mandatory disclo-
sure system does not prove that prior disclosure had been suboptimal; it
is possible that the imposition of mandatory disclosure reduced insid-
ers' wealth by an even larger amount, thereby reducing firm value (the
joint wealth of insiders and public investors). But unless insiders' wealth
decreased by more than the increase in public investors' wealth at every
firm, these studies suggest that the imposition of mandatory disclosure
increased the value of at least some of the affected firms.
B. Gone-dark Firms
Having seen evidence suggesting that the disclosure practices of
many OTC firms were unlikely to have been firm-optimal before they
entered the mandatory disclosure system in 1965, we now turn to con-
sider the disclosure practices of publicly traded firms after they exit
the mandatory disclosure system. I first describe these practices and
then explain why they provide further reason to be skeptical of the
claim that insiders not subject to mandatory disclosure will provide a
firm-optimal level of disclosure.
1. Insiders' post-exit disclosure choices.
Once a firm has exited mandatory disclosure, insiders are essentially
free to choose what information to disclose to investors.6 Indeed, noth-
65 See Ferrell, 36 J Legal Stud at 214 (cited in note 48); Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer,
and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns and the 1964 Securities Acts
Amendments, 121 Q J Econ 399,403 (2006).
66 Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-Jorgensen, 121 Q J Econ at 402-03 (cited in note 65)
(stating that OTC firms that faced certain new reporting requirements under the 1964 legislation
experienced "abnormal excess" returns of 11.5 percent to 22.1 percent during the period of time
around the enactment of that legislation).
67 Ferrell, 36 J Legal Stud at 246 (cited in note 48).
68 Insiders may still be subject to any state law disclosure requirements, which tend to be
minimal. See Part I.A.1.
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ing prevents insiders from offering a level of disclosure similar to that
required of reporting companies. For example, insiders could opt to
provide periodic disclosure of financial and conflict information, as well
updates of material changes in their firms' financial condition, on their
firms' websites or on pinksheetscom, the information repository main-
tained by the Pink Sheets market for firms quoted on that market.
However, the Leuz study finds that firms that exit mandatory dis-
closure subsequently provide little if any information to public share-
holders. Only 10 percent of the approximately five hundred firms that
went dark between 1998 and 2004 provided any financial statements to
investors on a website, and not all of these statements were audited.0
The researchers also telephoned gone-dark firms to check whether the
firms would provide information via regular mail. Only 4 percent of
firms were willing to provide information in this manner.0 And there
is no indication that any of these firms were willing to provide public
investors with conflict information-information about executive com-
pensation, insider stock transactions, or self-dealing arrangements -that
is critical for controlling inefficient self-dealing by insiders.71
The practices of the five hundred or so firms in the Leuz study do
not appear to diverge substantially from those of the other approx-
imately 3,200 nonreporting firms trading on the Pink Sheets. In 2007,
the Pink Sheets began categorizing firms based on the amount of in-
formation they provide to public investors. The three categories rele-
vant for domestic firms trading outside the mandatory disclosure sys-
tem are:
Current Information. Firms that provide "Adequate Current In-
formation" via the OTC Disclosure and News Service website,
including both financial and conflict information;"'
69 See Leuz, Triantis, and Wang, Why Do Firms Go Dark? at *33 (cited in note 35).
70 Id at *33-34 (reporting that, in response to telephone calls, 22 of the 484 gone-dark firms
were willing to mail information to potential investors).
71 Some of these firms may privately provide financial information to nonshareholder parties,
such as creditors, to assist these other parties in monitoring the firns. But any such arrangements
cannot adequately substitute for the provision of information to a firm's public investors. First,
information given to other parties does not reduce investors' trading costs. Second, creditors' inter-
est is limited to seeing their loans repaid. They have no incentive to monitor insiders to ensure that
the insiders do not skim off large private benefits for themselves at the expense of public investors,
unless the self-dealing is large enough to also impair the firm's ability to repay its debt.
72 See generally Pink Sheets, Guidelines for Providing Adequate Current Information (Aug
31, 2007), online at http://www.otcdealer.com/pinkdocs/Pink SheetsGuidelinesforProviding..
Adequate CurrentInformation.pdf (visited Jan 11, 2009) (laying out guidelines for providing
adequate "Current Information"); Pink Sheets, OTC Market Ters, online at http://www.pinksheets
com/pink/otcguidefmvestors-market-tiers.jsp (visited Jan 11, 2009) (defining "Current Informa-
tion" companies as "[r]eporting companies that submit filings to regulators with powers of review
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Limited Information. Firms that have provided limited informa-
tion on the OTC Disclosure and News Service website or have
made a SEC filing within the previous six months;" and
No Information. Firms not providing current disclosure to the
Pink Sheets."4
As of late 2008, only a small number of the 3,700 or so nonreport-
ing firms trading on the Pink Sheets provided "Current Information,"
about five hundred provided "Limited Information," and about 3,200
were considered to provide "No Information." 5 Even if those firms
listed as providing "Limited Information" were in fact providing firm-
optimal amounts of information to the market, the Pink Sheets' own
data suggest that the vast majority of nonreporting firms trading on
the Pink Sheets, like most of the firms in the Leuz study, provide little
or no information to public investors.
2. Could zero disclosure to public investors be firm-optimal?
The failure of insiders of most gone-dark firms to provide any in-
formation to their public investors -either financial information or
conflict information-raises significant doubts about the claim that
insiders will voluntarily provide firm-optimal amounts of information
to public investors.
To begin, for any given firm the benefits of providing at least
some information is likely to outweigh the costs. As Part II.A.1 ex-
plained, there is little debate that periodic corporate disclosure provides
substantial benefits to investors by reducing investors' trading costs and
enabling public shareholders to better monitor insiders, thereby reduc-
ing agency costs. At the same time, the direct costs of disclosing infor-
mation are low. The firm already has all the information at hand.
and that make the filings publicly available or non-reporting companies that make current informa-
tion publicly available through the OTC Disclosure and News Service").
73 The "Limited Information" tier includes
companies with financial reporting problems, economic distress, or in bankruptcy to make the
limited information they have publicly available. The Limited Information category also in-
cludes companies that may not be troubled, but are unwilling to meet Pink OTC Markets'
Guidelines for Providing Adequate Current Information. Companies in this category have
posted limited financial information not older than six months through the OTC Disclosure and
News Service or have made a filing on the SEC's EDGAR system in the previous six months
Pink Sheets, OTC Market Tiers (cited in note 72).
74 See id.
75 I used the Pink Sheets search function on October 19, 2008 to count the number of
domestic stocks in each tier. See Pink Sheets, Advanced OTC Company Search, online at http://
pinksheets.com/pink/companysearch/index.jsp (visited Jan 11, 2009). Approximately six hundred
firms were considered to be providing "Current Information," but all but a handful of these firms
are reporting firms under the securities laws that happened to be trading on the Pink Sheets
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Of course, the disclosure of certain financial information might re-
veal information to competitors or other parties that could be used to
the disclosing firm's disadvantage."' Thus, it may not be firm-optimal to
disclose certain types of financial information. However, given the
substantial benefits provided by disclosure, it is highly unlikely that
across a wide variety of firms the optimal level of disclosure of both
financial information and conflict information is zero, particularly
since conflict information is crucial for controlling agency costs and is
unlikely to reduce firm value by benefiting competitors. To my know-
ledge, no commentator has ever asserted that the optimal level of dis-
closure to investors in a publicly traded firm could be zero.
The stock market's highly negative reaction to going-dark an-
nouncements provides further reason to be skeptical that post-exit
disclosure levels are firm-optimal. The reaction suggests that the antic-
ipated change in the level of disclosure is likely to make public inves-
tors worse off."8 Moreover, it suggests that the cost to public investors
from the expected reduction in disclosure is greater than any benefit
to them from eliminating the expenses of complying with the manda-
tory disclosure rules. Interestingly, the stock price reaction to going-
dark announcements is similar in magnitude (although opposite in
direction) to that reported in the studies examining firms that were
forced to enter mandatory disclosure in 1965."9
To be sure, the market's negative reaction to going-dark an-
nouncements cannot prove that anticipated post-exit disclosure is less
than firm-optimal, just as the market's positive reaction to the imposi-
tion of mandatory disclosure on certain OTC firms in 1965 cannot
prove that the previous level of disclosure was suboptimal. Theoreti-
cally, the reduced level of disclosure following exit could increase in-
siders' wealth by more than it reduces public investors' wealth, there-
76 See Fox, 85 Va L Rev at 1345-46 (cited in note 50); Goshen and Parchomovsky, 55 Duke
L J at 756 (cited in note 49).
77 One could argue that it might be firm-optimal to avoid disclosing any financial and
conflict information to the market because such disclosure could expose the firm to "strike"
lawsuits (nonmeritorious lawsuits brought solely to extract a settlement) alleging fraud. But
lawyers are unlikely to find strike suits against Pink Sheets firms profitable. Given these firms'
small trading volumes, the potential damages to selling (or buying) shareholders of any misrepre-
sentation will tend to be very low. And even if there is some risk of a strike suit, the expected cost
associated with such litigation is likely to be far smaller than the cost to public shareholders of
having no information about the firm's financial condition and insider self-dealing transactions.
78 The negative stock price response to a going-dark announcement may in part reflect
new information about the "disclosure-independent" value of the firm transmitted by the an-
nouncement. In particular, firms that choose to exit mandatory disclosure may have worse business
prospects than those that do not, whether or not they exit mandatory disclosure. To the extent the
going-dark announcement communicates unfavorable information about the firm's "disclosure-
independent" value, the market's reaction is not entirely attributable to the exit itself.
79 See Part II.A.2.
2009]
The University of Chicago Law Review
by increasing firm value. But unless insiders' wealth increases by more
than public investors' wealth declines at every firm, at least some going-
dark firms are moving to a less desirable level of disclosure.
Importantly, the evidence does not suggest that insiders will al-
ways offer a suboptimal amount of disclosure if given the choice. For
example, there are many reporting firms with fewer than three hun-
dred holders of record. The insiders of such firms should be seen as
voluntarily providing the relatively high level of disclosure required
by the securities laws, as they could easily exit mandatory disclosure
but choose not to do so. Nor does the evidence imply that the SEC's
current mandatory disclosure regime is the most desirable disclosure
regime -it may well require too much disclosure.8 However, the failure
of most gone-dark firms to provide any disclosure to public investors
and the market's sharply negative reaction to going-dark announce-
ments do cast further doubt on the claim that insiders generally can be
counted on to voluntarily provide the firm-optimal level of disclosure.
III. A NEW APPROACH TO REGULATING EXITS
FROM MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
We saw in Part I that the securities laws currently permit insiders
of a publicly traded firm to exit the mandatory disclosure system even
when the firm's shares remain publicly traded and may be held by
thousands of shareholders. We then saw in Part II that, after such an
exit, insiders generally do not appear to provide a firm-optimal level
of disclosure, hurting public investors.
This Part proposes a new approach to regulating exits of publicly
traded firms from mandatory disclosure. Part III.A shows that enabl-
ing insiders to unilaterally exit mandatory disclosure may lead to un-
desirable exits. In particular, insiders may exit mandatory disclosure
even when exit reduces firm value-the joint wealth of insiders and
public investors. It also explains that adoption of the institutional in-
vestors' 2003 proposal to tighten the recordholder test would reduce,
but not eliminate, value-decreasing exits.
Part III.B puts forward the new approach to regulating exits from
mandatory disclosure: requiring firms to obtain public shareholder ap-
proval for any such exit. Giving public shareholders veto rights, it de-
80 See Leuz, Triantis, and Wang, Why Do Firms Go Dark? at *14-15 (cited in note 35)
(noting that the control sample used in the paper's regression analysis consists of over two thousand
firms that could have exited mandatory disclosure under the applicable recordholder limits).
81 See, for example, Romano, 107 Yale L J at 2375 (cited in note 54) (discussing evidence
suggesting that a number of the SEC's disclosure mandates are unlikely to be cost-effective).
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monstrates, should completely eliminate undesirable exits of publicly
traded firms from mandatory disclosure, and should do so at little cost.
A. The Problem with Insider Control over Exits
The current rules enabling insiders to unilaterally decide when
firms exit mandatory disclosure as publicly traded companies is likely
to lead to value-decreasing exits. Adoption of the institutional investors'
proposal to tighten the recordholder test will reduce value-decreasing
exits, but not eliminate them.
1. Under current rules.
The exit of a publicly traded firm from the mandatory disclosure
system could either increase or decrease firm value (defined as the
joint wealth of insiders and public investors). Unless the firm commits
in advance to provide a firm-optimal level of disclosure after it exits
mandatory disclosure, exit is likely to a lead to a suboptimal level of
disclosure that increases both insider agency costs and public inves-
tors' trading costs, reducing firm value. However, exit is likely to pro-
vide benefits by eliminating the compliance costs associated with be-
ing a reporting company. The net effect of exit on firm value could
therefore be positive or negative, depending on the relative magni-
tudes of these costs and benefits."
The problem with giving insiders the ability to unilaterally exit
mandatory disclosure is that insiders may benefit from a value-
decreasing exit. As Part II.A explained, moving to a suboptimal level
of disclosure may enable insiders to extract more private benefits. And
the stock price drop caused by suboptimally low disclosure may enable
insiders, who know the shares' actual value, to accumulate stock at a
bargain price." The stock market's sharply negative reaction to exit an-
nouncements is consistent with insider-driven exits reducing firm value.
82 A firm exiting mandatory disclosure could commit to provide post-exit disclosure by, for
example, putting a provision in its charter obligating the board to provide certain information to
public investors that could not be waived or modified without the consent of those investors.
83 If insiders must first eliminate a certain number of public shareholders to satisfy the
recordholder test, exit may have additional effects-either positive or negative-on firm value
arising from the cashing out of these shareholders. For example, if the firm uses its existing assets
to cash out some of its public investors and the cash would generate higher (lower) returns in the
hands of shareholders than in the firm, such distribution will increase (reduce) firm value. These
additional effects would need to be considered in determining whether a particular exit increases
or decreases firm value.
84 See Coffee, 70 Va L Rev at 722 (cited in note 49). Insiders' ability to buy stock directly
from public investors after the firm exits mandatory disclosure is somewhat restricted by Rule
lOb-5, which makes it illegal for insiders to buy stock on the basis of material, nonpublic infor-
mation. See Chiarella v United States, 445 US 222,227-33 (1980) (describing circumstances under
2009]
The University of Chicago Law Review
To be sure, insiders' exit incentives may often be aligned with
firm-value maximization. Some exits may both benefit insiders and
increase firm value." And in many cases both insiders and the firm are
better off remaining in the mandatory disclosure system.' But the key
point is that insiders cannot be counted on to make exit decisions that
maximize the joint wealth of insiders and public investors. As a result,
enabling insiders to decide whether their firms exit mandatory disclo-
sure can lead to value-decreasing exits.
2. Institutional investors' proposal.
As noted in the Introduction, a number of institutional investors
petitioned the SEC in 2003 to change the definition of "holder of
record" in the recordholder test to "beneficial owner." This recommen-
dation, if implemented, would prohibit firms from exiting mandatory
disclosure unless they have fewer than three hundred beneficial owners.
Adoption of the institutional investors' proposal may well reduce
the number of value-decreasing exits. Firms with three hundred or
more beneficial owners that might be permitted to exit mandatory
disclosure under the current recordholder test could no longer exit
mandatory disclosure without first conducting a reverse stock split or
repurchase tender offer to reduce the number of recordholders to
below three hundred. The requirement that insiders cash out some
public investors prior to exit would, among other things, reduce the
amount of value these firms' insiders could divert from public inves-
tors by going dark. It should thus reduce insiders' incentive to engage
in value-decreasing exits.'
which Rule 10b-5 creates a duty to disclose or abstain from trading when a person possesses
material nonpublic information). But it may not be illegal for insiders to buy stock in the public
market before the firm exits mandatory disclosure, after the going-dark announcement causes a
significant drop in the stock price. And once the firm has gone dark, insiders might not be deterred
from buying stock directly from public investors in violation of Rule lOb-5. Because the firm has
exited mandatory disclosure, insider stock transactions are no longer publicly reported. Thus, it will
be extremely difficult, without commencing expensive litigation, for public shareholders to even
know whether insiders are buying shares, Insiders contemplating buying the firm's stock in violation
of Rule 10b-5 may therefore reasonably believe that the probability of detection and punishment
is quite low.
85 Note that an exit could be value-increasing even when post-exit disclosure is not firm-
optimal. For example, the elimination of compliance costs associated with being a reporting compa-
ny could outweigh the reduction in benefits from reduced disclosure. Of course, in this case, exit
would be even more value-increasing if post-exit disclosure were firm-optimal.
86 For example, when insiders expect to sell shares (either directly or indirectly, through a
secondary public offering by the firm), they will generally be better off not exiting the mandatory
system, which would depress the stock price and reduce the proceeds they can get from selling shares
87 By definition, value-decreasing exits shrink the size of the pie. Thus insiders can benefit
from such an exit only if: (1) the exit enables insiders to expropriate more value from public inves-
tors, and (2) such additional expropriation is large enough to offset insiders' share of the loss of firm
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However, adoption of the institutional investors' proposal would
not eliminate insiders' incentives to undertake value-decreasing exits
in order to expropriate value from public investors. First, it would
have no effect on insiders' ability to conduct value-decreasing exits in
firms that currently have fewer than three hundred beneficial owners.
Second, in other firms the institutional investors' proposal would re-
quire only that enough public investors be eliminated to get below the
three-hundred-owner threshold; insiders could still divert value from
the remaining public investors after the firm goes dark. Third, as Part I
explained, reverse stock splits and repurchase tender offers conducted
in the shadow of an anticipated insider-driven exit from mandatory
disclosure can be used to cash out public investors at less than the ac-
tual value of their shares. Thus, under the institutional investors' pro-
posal, insiders' ability to exit mandatory disclosure still could be used
to extract value from public investors even before the firm exits. In
short, while the institutional investors' proposal would reduce value-
reducing exits from mandatory disclosure, it may not eliminate them.
B. The Shareholder-veto Approach
Because any regime in which insiders of publicly traded firms can
unilaterally choose to exit mandatory disclosure is likely to lead to
value-reducing exits, I now put forward an alternative approach: giv-
ing public shareholders the right to veto exits from mandatory disclo-
sure. Such an approach, I show, should eliminate value-decreasing exits
without undesirably trapping firms in the mandatory disclosure system.
1. The proposed approach.
Under the shareholder-veto rule I propose, a firm could exit man-
datory disclosure as a publicly traded firm only if it obtains the con-
sent of a majority of the firm's public shareholders. By "public share-
holders," I mean shareholders other than the firm's insiders (officers,
directors, controlling shareholders, and related parties). A firm that no
longer has public shareholders need not hold such a vote before exit-
ing mandatory disclosure.
Not all public investors could be expected to participate in such a
shareholder vote. For example, individual investors holding relatively
few shares may decline to participate on the belief that their votes are
value caused by exit. To the extent the institutional investors' proposal reduces insiders' ability to
expropriate value from public investors, it will make fewer undesirable exits attractive to insiders.
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unlikely to matter. Thus, firms seeking to go dark would be required
only to obtain the approval of a majority of the public shares voted."
Obtaining public shareholder approval would not be sufficient to
exit mandatory disclosure; the firm would still need to be otherwise
eligible to terminate reporting obligations at the time of the vote. Thus,
for example, the firm would need to have fewer than three hundred
recordholders when the vote is held.9 For this purpose, a "recordhold-
er" would be defined (as the institutional investors' 2003 proposal
recommends) as a beneficial owner. The shareholder-veto approach
may thus prevent a firm from exiting mandatory disclosure that could
exit under the institutional investors' proposed rule.
Importantly, the proposed approach would not affect the ability
of firms to exit mandatory disclosure by eliminating all public share-
holders through a going-private transaction. For example, insiders
could still cash out all of a firm's public investors in a freeze-out mer-
ger or equivalent transaction (for example, selling the firm's assets to
an acquirer and distributing the proceeds of the sale to all sharehold-
ers pro rata). The veto rule would apply only in those cases where
public investors continue to own shares in the firm when it seeks to
exit mandatory disclosure.
The intuition behind the proposed shareholder-veto approach is
quite simple. When purchasing a firm's shares, public investors likely
believed that the firm would continue to be a reporting company as
long as they remained shareholders. These investors should have a voice
in deciding whether the firm exits mandatory disclosure as a publicly
traded company, potentially leaving them in the dark.
88 For the shareholder-voting rule to reflect public shareholders' true preferences as share-
holders, it is critical that the vote not be tied to a transaction that discriminates between those
shareholders voting approvingly and those voting disapprovingly. For example, insiders should
not be permitted to conduct a repurchase tender offer that requires public investors' tendering
their shares, before receiving payment, to vote their shares in favor of the firm exiting mandatory
disclosure. Such a coupling of the vote to payoffs would create a prisoners' dilemma problem
that may cause public shareholders to vote for an exit they oppose.
89 1 suggest a recordholder threshold of three hundred to conform the proposal as closely
as possible to current rules for exiting mandatory disclosure. Other thresholds may be consi-
dered. However, it is worth noting that the use of a threshold of five hundred or more record-
holders would conflict with mandatory disclosure's "entry" rules. Currently, any firm with at least
five hundred recordholders and more than $10 million in assets must register with the SEC and
enter the mandatory disclosure system. See notes 12-14 and accompanying text. It would be
inconsistent with these entry rules to permit firms with at least five hundred recordholders to
exit mandatory disclosure through a public shareholder vote.
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2. Effect of the proposal on value-decreasing and
value-increasing exits.
The shareholder-veto approach should eliminate value-decreasing
exits from the mandatory system by publicly traded firms while preserv-
ing these firms' ability to engage in value-increasing exits. Consider an
exit that would reduce firm value-the joint wealth of insiders and
public investors-but that would benefit insiders. By definition, such
an exit would make public investors worse off Thus, if insiders pro-
pose such an exit, public investors would be expected to vote against
it. Anticipating this outcome, insiders might not even bother propos-
ing such an exit to public investors. In either case, the shareholder-veto
approach should prevent the value-reducing exit. One might be con-
cerned that the shareholder-veto approach would prevent value-
increasing exits from mandatory disclosure by publicly traded firms.
Consider an exit that increases the joint wealth of insiders and public
investors but makes public investors worse off. Because public inves-
tors would have an incentive to reject any proposed exit that makes
them worse off, they could be expected to veto this proposed exit,
even though it is value-increasing.
But if an exit were in fact value-increasing, insiders should be
able to obtain public shareholder approval by taking steps to ensure
that public shareholders are not made worse off. For example, insiders
could agree to put a provision in the firm's charter that commits the
firm to continue to provide a certain amount of information to the
market after the firm exits mandatory disclosure. Such a provision, in
turn, would increase public investors' wealth by reducing their post-exit
trading costs and by diminishing the value that insiders can divert from
public investors after exit. In addition (or alternatively), insiders could
promise to make a dividend payment to shareholders as the firm exits
mandatory disclosure to ensure that public investors share some of the
surplus created by exit. If insiders are unable to obtain public investors'
consent to a proposed exit from mandatory disclosure, that exit is un-
likely to be value-increasing for the firm.
Finally, it is worth repeating that the requirement of public share-
holder approval for exiting mandatory disclosure would not affect a
firm's ability to exit mandatory disclosure by going private. As under
current law, insiders could always exit mandatory disclosure by elimi-
nating all public shareholders through a merger or other transaction
in which each of the firm's shareholders, including the firm's public
investors, receives cash for their stock. Once public investors have
been eliminated, a firm could exit mandatory disclosure without hold-
ing a vote. The shareholder-veto approach would only block a pro-
posed exit from mandatory disclosure when: (1) insiders refuse to cash
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out all public shareholders, and (2) a majority of the firm's public shares
are voted against the exit.
CONCLUSION
The securities laws have permitted insiders of hundreds of firms to
exit the mandatory disclosure system even though their firms' shares
continue to be publicly traded and may be held by thousands of inves-
tors. Such exiting firms are said to "go dark" because they subsequent-
ly provide little information to public investors. This Article has ad-
dressed the going-dark phenomenon. It has explained how firms cur-
rently can go dark over the objection of their public investors. It has
also shown that insiders' post-exit disclosure practices undermine the
claim, advanced by critics of mandatory disclosure, that insiders can be
counted on to voluntarily provide adequate information to investors.
Finally, it has put forward a new approach to regulating going-dark
firms: giving public shareholders the right to veto exits from mandatory
disclosure. Such an approach, this Article has shown, should prevent
undesirable exits from mandatory disclosure by publicly traded firms
while preserving these firms' ability to engage in value-increasing exits.
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